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KOMITETI SHQIPTAR
Qendra e Studimeve Parlamentare
I
HELSINKIT
Center for Parliamentary Studies
To:
Mr. Spartak Ngjela
Chairman, Parliamentary Commission on Legal,
Public Administration, and Human Rights Issues
Mr. Leonard Demi
Chairman, Parliamentary Commission on National Security
Ms. Valetina Leskaj
Chairwoman, Parliamentary Commission on Education and
Mass Media
From:
Prof.as.dr. Vasilika Hysi
Executive Director
Albanian Helsinki Committee
Mr. Sokol Berberi
Executive Director
Center for Parliamentary Studies
Tirana, February
27, 2006
The
Albanian Helsinki Committee and the Center for Parliamentary Studies, after
reviewing the draft law "On some amendments to Law No. 8457, dated 11.2.1999 “On
information classified as state secret,” considered it necessary to submit to
the commissions You chair, the following observations:
1.
The draft law envisions additions to articles 1, 2, and 3 of the law No.
8457, dated 11.2.1999, and amendments to articles 23, 24, and 27 of the same
law. Article 3 of the law No. 8457, dated 11.2 1999 “On information classified
as state secret” envisions: “A state secret, in terms of its contents, values,
and state interest, is classified into one of the three levels:
a)
“Top secret” when its unauthorized release may cause particularly serious
damage to national security;
b) “Secret” when its unauthorized release may cause serious damage to national
security;
c) “Confidential” when its unauthorized release may cause damage to national
security”.
After
letter “c” of the above article, this paragraph has been added: “Limited”, when
its unauthorized release may cause damage to the state's normal activity and to
the interests of effectiveness of state institutions”.
It is our opinion that, looking at the above additions and
amendments, the addition planned to article 3 of the law No. 8457, is serious,
very disputable, and may lead to unjustified limitation of the constitutional
right to be informed.
First, article 3 of the above-mentioned law provides the levels of
classification of state secret, i.e. their classification is made, which are
three levels in spite of the damage that may be caused ("especially serious
damage," "serious damage," or "damage"), we are talking about national security.
In fact, the lawmaker intentionally stressed in the last paragraph of article 3
of law No. 8457 that "no other term shall be used to define state secret."
Second, although article 2 of the draft includes the addition
intended to be made to article 3 of the law as a continuation of the three
levels of the classification of state secret, unlike these three levels, the
addition does not mention the damage that may be caused to national security.
The damage that may be caused to "the state's normal activity" and to "the
interests or effectiveness of state institutions" cannot be equated to damage
that may be caused to national security. Should this amendment be approved,
considering the way it is formulated and the subjective space allowed to its
implementation in practice, we think that the citizens' right to be informed
about state activity, a fundamental right in democracy, might be violated. The
right to information is guaranteed by article 10 of the European Convention,
article 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania, and law No. 8503,
dated 30.6.1999 “On the right to information on official documents."
Third, in a democratic society like today's, respect for freedom of
expression and the right to be informed require that their limitation be
rigorously defined by law and only when it is indispensable for national
security, public safety, protection of public order, and prevention of crime,
protection of health or morality, protection of others' freedoms and rights. It
is worth mentioning that law No. 8457, dated 11.2.1999 “On information
classified as state secret" is specific because the unauthorized release of
pertinent data may cause damage to national security.
2.
The draft law in question does not specify the body or the clear procedure
regarding the classification of a piece of information as "limited information."
The fact that the last paragraph of the changed article 7 says: "Ministries and
state institutions protect classified information of NATO, other countries, and
international organizations, in keeping with standards that ensure protection
commensurate to that required by NATO, other countries, or international
organizations," does not mean that the above bodies also have the right to make
classification of information into "limited" information. If those who wrote the
draft did not consider it necessary to envision this in the draft, as article 4
of the law No. 8457 talks about the classifying authority, it is our view that
this is not justifiable exactly because authorities for classifying information,
such as the President, the Prime Minister, etc., are considered original
classification authorities, i.e. authorities of first classification, which is
always related to damage that may be caused to national security.
3.
It is also worth mentioning that damages to the normal activity of the state
and interests or effectiveness of state institutions may be caused also due to
other factors not related to national security, such as for instance due to
corruption, conflict of interest, the commission of criminal offences, failure
to rigorously implement laws, etc. In that aspect, we think that what is said in
article 10 of the law No. 8457, dated 11.2.1999 “On information classified as
state secret," is very significant: "The classification of a piece of
information is prohibited when that is done for the purpose of hiding legal
violations, ineffectiveness or errors of the administration, depriving a person,
institution, or organization of a right, or to obstruct or delay the provision
of information that requires protection in the interest of national security."
The contents of the above article could be a disturbing warning that the
intended addition to article 3 of the law should be reviewed with proper
seriousness and necessary objectiveness in order to prevent harmful consequences
of limiting the right to be informed. From that standpoint, it is worth
referring also to the second paragraph of article 1 of the law No. 8457, that
expressly says: "The state is the sole possessor of state secrets, regulating
this right with the right of the public to be familiar with its activity." This
means that even the limitation of state secrets should be balanced with the
right to be informed and the right of the public to be informed. So, limitation
should be commensurate to the situation that dictated it.
4.
The European Court of Human Rights has created a rich jurisprudence on the
right to information. This jurisprudence assumes constitutional value in the
Albanian context. The European Court of Human Rights was very attentive and at
the same time very rigorous in interpreting and respecting article 10 of the
European Convention (Freedom of Expression). "It is the duty of the press" – one
of its decisions reads – "to give information and ideas on political issues and
other issues of public interest. Not only is it the right of the press to give
information, but the public also has the right to receive such information." The
European Court of Human Rights has defined regulations on strict interpretations
of potential limitations envisioned by the second paragraph of article 10 of the
Convention. For instance, in the case Sunday Times against the United Kingdom,
the Court said: "Strict interpretation means that no other criteria, except for
those mentioned in the provision of exceptions to the rule, could be at the
foundation of any limitation and these criteria, on the other hand, should be
understood in such a way that language does not extend beyond its normal meaning
(Commission Report, May 18, 1977, paragraph 194-195, European Court of Human
Rights, B Series, No. 28, Page 64)".
We
are ready to present these views and claims in a hearing session in the
Commission You chair, should that be considered necessary.
Respectfully,
Prof. as. dr. Vasilika HYSI Sokol
BERBERI
Executive Director Executive
Director
Albanian Helsinki Committee Center for
Parliamentary Studies
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